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CONSTRUCTION OF PICTORIAL MEANING
PAVEL MACHOTKA
JOHN P. SPIEGEL 1
Whether perception is treated as a process in time
or as a near-instantaneous achievement depends on
the problem of study. For many purposes the assumption of instantaneity is convenient-as when
one is interested in the relation that finished percepts
bear to simple stimulus arrays . The perceptio n of inequality in the Muller-Lyer arr~ws , ~~e s~nse of. solidity of a convex edge, and the 1dent1f1cat1on of ~nan
gularity or squareness are all examples of ach1eved
percept s whose quality is of more interest than the
process by which they may have been pr<?duced.
As stimulus arrays become complex, 1t becomes
impossible to ignore the process by which they are
recognized, interpreted, and integrat~d into one's
structure of cognitions and needs. While the nature
of the process has not been spec~fied, it is clear .from
certain lines of evidence that a fa1rly lengthy senes of
events does take place. Thus from the work of Yarbus
on eye movements (1967) it is evident that the eye can
wander over the surface of even a simple picture in an
uninterrupted fashion for several minutes. Because
the eye moves differently in response to different
"questions" ·asked of the picture! it is clear th~t the
eye is instituting a search; what 1s not known 1s the
sense that the perceptual and cognitive apparatus
makes of the data received in this linear fashion. From
quite different evidence-interviews with subjects
who are asked to say what they "see" in a painting-it
has been found (Spiegel and Machotka 1974) that
hypotheses are formed, confirmed, discarded, or
reshaped; that attention turns from one part of the
picture to another; that an integration of .several. impressions may be attempted; that the p1cture 1s at
times viewed as a picture and at other t1mes as the
objects which it represents; and that the proces~ can
be drawn out at quite some length. An attempt will be
made here to construct a framework for understanding that process.
Our task is made easier by the recognition (Flavell
and Draguns 1957; Smith 1957) that even the per~ep
tion ,of simple arrays may require a process 1~ t1me,
albeit a brief one. Whether the construction of
meaning from a complex representation is function-
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ally similar to the "microgenesis" of a percept is not
clear, but some parallels may be suggested. The e~i
dence gathered and interpreted by N.eisser (~967_) will
serve as our best point of companson; h1s v1ews,
consisting of both observations and parsimonious
extrapolations from them, may for our purposes be
grouped under three tenets:. .
.
.
1. The observation of cond1t1ons under wh1ch v1sual
input is retained shows that perception is not a matter
of passive recording. In the first place, memory traces
(or, as they are called by Neisser, icons) of a visual
input are highly evanescent, lasting at most abo~t o~e
second; if they have not been grasped by that t1me. 1n
another part of the perceptual apparatus, they vamsh
altogether. If on the other hand they are to be
grasped, they must be coded by a differe~t process
into one or another category. These categones can be
linguistic, as with words by which the icon can be
labeled, or they can be nonlinguistic, as in the case of
frameworks of meanings, memories, fantasies, and
other schemata. In the second place, the percept as it
is subjectively experienced and the memory of the
event as it is later recalled are outcomes of the coding
process.
2. The coding process can be multiple or sequential. Multiple coding is more complex, and at the
same time less well organized; because several coding processes can coexist without apparent interconnection, the whole may resemble what Freud called
the primary process. Sequential coding works on.e
step at a time, in such a manner t.h~t ea~h s~ep IS
dependent on the preceding steps; 1t IS log1cal 1n the
usual sense of the term, and its primary, but by no
means only, instance is linguistic coding and reasoning.
3. Because these two types of coding, although
logically distinct, can operate at the same tim~, and
because a coding process once completed can m turn
influence what further visual input will be attended
to-the whole resulting in an unending cycle of purposive or purposeless mental activities-perception
even of simple arrays is best viewed as a process of
construction.

A MODEL FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF
MEANING
Our model of the construction of meaning from
pictorial representation was wo~ked ou~ independently of Neisser's and on t~e ?as.l~ of ~nt1rely dlffe~
ent observations, but the s1mllant1es 1t be.ars to h1s
encourage us to believe that we are on the nght t~ack.
To account for the verbal descriptions that subJects
had made to us of pictures they were attending to, we
needed to take note of the coding categories they
employed and of the vicissitudes they u~derwent ~s
the process unfolded. Unlike the expenmen~al .evidence gathered by Neisser, our ~erbal descnpt.1ons
are vaguer in delineating the attnbutes of the v1sual
CONSTRUCTION OF PICTORIAL MEANING
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array to which the subject is attending, but richer in
revealing the hypotheses that are formed and tested
and the fantasies that are adduced or integrated with
the visible evidence. But very much like the percepts
as Neisser understands them, our constructions result in and are then again governed by one or more
schemata. The term "schema" seems particularly appropriate because it denotes organization and at the
same time suggests flexibility or even tentativeness; it
was defined by Bartlett (1932) as "an active organization of past experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organized
response," and his definition, while perhaps overstressing the necessity of adaptation, serves us well.
In this paper we attempt, then, to account for the
processes of construction of pictorial meaning as they
are revealed in verbal descriptions. It should be noted
that reliance on verbal descriptions has both drawbacks and advantages. In 1934 Claparede (cited by
Miller et al. 1960) pointed out that verbal descriptions
may make the process sound more coherent than it
really is, that talking may inhibit thought processes or
slow them down, and that subjects may fall silent just
when their processes might be of the greatest interest. To these disadvantages we would add that of
hiding from the investigator the very rapid initial visual searching and coding of the picture that takes
place before anything has been said. But, quite apart
.from our having no visible alternative to this procedure, its advantages are just as real. Principal among
them is that the procedure reveals the thought processes that become intertwined with the visual scanning and identification: the hypotheses that the subject entertains, the evidence that he searches for, the
changes in interpretation when the evidence fails to
fit, the degree of coherence of the overall percept,
and the fantasies that the subject spins out from his
private world. The procedure also tells us whether the
subject is attending to the picture as an object in its
own right or if he is seeing it as a representation of
another object or even as the representative of the
picture's author. It tells us whether the viewer is attentive to the picture at all or if his fantasies overwhelm the visual scanning. And it tells us something
about the visual scanning itself, as when it reveals
surprise at a hitherto unnoticed feature.
. Our modeF for the activity that picture interpretatl.on represents requires us to note three processes
~~m.ultaneously, ~f which the first two are quite readIly mferable, while the third (no less important) invol.ves an e~trapolation of larger governing cognitive
u~1ts. The f1rst process is what we may call the underlytng perceptual strategy toward the visual display
while the second refers to the search for sources of
evidence for meaning. The third-better clarified at
t~is stage of .o~r. model by actual examples than by
ngorous def1n1t1on-connotes the formation of a
schema, which is initially a product of a partial percept .and then an organization governing further perception, fantasy, and reasoning. A schema may
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eventually be weakened, firmed up, or simply set
aside while another schema comes into play.
PERCEPTUAL STRATEGIES

The underlying perceptual strategies are cognitive
operations of a high enough order so that they cannot
be evidenced from indices such as eye movements
but remain clear to the person experiencing them
and, when adequately verbalized, to the investigator
as well. They represent choices as to the method of
seeing the picture, choices which, it appears to us,
the viewer cannot avoid making. They occur on three
dimensions, and insofar as they occur at all, occur
simultaneously, which is to say that for the most prevalent kind of picture-one that intends to represent
and whose subject matter is human-a choice of
mode of perceiving has to be made on three dimensions at the same time.
On the first dimension the viewer decides whether
to view the picture as an object in its own right and
with its own intrinsic properties, or to see it only for
the content that it represents, or to see it as a product
(of a historical period, a stage in the artist's life, a
specific artistic intention, and so on). Thus the picture
might be viewed as having a certain visual balance
TABLE 1
THE PROCESS OF INTERPRETING PICTURES:
CATEGORIES OF ANALYSIS

Underlying Perceptual Strategies
Picture as picture vs. picture as content vs. picture as product
Observer viewpoint vs. participant viewpoint
Part of picture vs. whole
Source of Evidence for Meaning
From antecedents
search for title
identification of author
identification of period or style
attribution of intention to artist
attribution of ritual meaning to ambiguous gestures
assumption of overall message
search for supplementary information
deductive reasoning from external cues
From picture itself
search to identify objects, scene , or setting
identification of roles and role activities
attention to body position or movement
construction of scenario
deductive reasoning from internal cues
search for corroborating evidence
attention to formal properties
attention to compositional needs
From observer' s needs
undifferentiated affective burst
empathy or identification with a figure
attribution of feeling to a figure
attribution of feeling to picture (or self)
attribution of character to a figure
projection of fantasy
projection of needs, conflicts, or coping mechanisms
avoidance of picture

STUDIES IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF VISUAL COMMUNICATION

("picture as picture"), as showing a female figure
tendering an apple to a male figure ("picture as content"), or as a 16th-century Venetian painting such
as one by Ti nto retto ("picture as product"). The
viewpoint may change with time, slowly or rapidly,
but quite likely only a single viewpoint may be maintained at any one time.
On the second dimension the viewer decides
whether to understand the depiction of human activity from his point of view as an observer or from the
point of view of one of the other depicting participants. In our work on nonverbal communication (1974)
we. noted that observers may feel rebuffed by barriers
erected against approach to an attractive figure-as
by the covering arms of Botticelli's Venus (see Figure
1)-and inferred that the observer engages in some
sort of fantasied relation to the figure. Such a fantasied relation, whether conscious or unconscious,
with a single figure or more than one constitutes the
observer viewpoint. But the viewer may also adopt
the point of view of one of the figures and understand
the other figures' actions and feelings from it; thus he
may himself "feel" the comfort that a baby sitting on
its mother's lap is experiencing: this we call the participant viewpoint.
The third dimension of perceptual strategy is the
decision to attend to a part of the visual display or to
the whole. It is likely that attending to a part of
something as complex as a painting is easier than attending to the whole; studies of eye movements can,
in fact, show only successive attention to parts and
may make us question whether attention to the whole
is possible. Yet our own experience indicates that one
can perceive the whole at one time, although perhaps
only under special conditions. For an untrained observer, turning a picture upside down may suffice to
obliterate subject matter and make formal interrelations clear; as he becomes less busy with identifying
detail he can see a broad surface. Trained observers
can accomplish this simply by shifting the pattern of
their attention; and untrained observers may also
succeed in doing so without rotating the picture, after
becoming sated with attention to detail.

SOURCES OF MEANING
Intersecting these strategies is the complex visual
and cognitive search for meaning. We distinguish
three sources of meaning 3 and subdivide each into a
fairly large number of categories; we are not
suggesting that the categories are exhaustive, but
they do account for most of the data we have attempted to analyze. We shall here list the categories
we believe are needed, illustrate their use by applying
them to instances of pictorial interpretation, and then
suggest how they might be used in future research.
The first source of meaning includes material which
is extraneous to the picture, either by virtue of pre-

ceding it in time or by being in some manner connected with it subsequently. Thus, faced with a
painting in a museum or a reproduction in his hand,
an observer may be seen to search for a title or attempt to identify the artist or the period to which the
painting belongs, even when the picture is visually
unambiguous. As a way of reducing ambiguity, subjects have attributed various intentions to the artist ("I
am speaking of the prudishness of the painter, not of
the persons within the frame") or assumed ritual
meaning in ambiguous gestures (" ... the second
person from the right appears to be making some sort
of formal sign, as for instance in an oriental dance").
We have also noted that subjects may assume that the
picture as a whole has a message to convey ("Both of
these pictures could simply be departure scenes"), by
which message they may integrate a number of disparate, often puzzling elements. Finally, perhaps to
justify or clarify a vague impression, subjects may
search their memories for supplementary information
("She reminds me of Anna Russell") or engage in deductive reasoning from cues external to the painting
(as in the following response to a suggestion by the
interviewer: "Funny, that did not occur to me. In
which case it would be perfectly natural for a lady of
the higher class to be here"). These interpretive
sources are characteristically applied to painting and
drawing and generally ignored in a more documentary medium such as photography, but there appears
to be no intrinsicreason why, at least in part, sensitive
observers should not find them applicable to photographs as well.
Meaning can be sought from the picture itself. By
this we are not saying that nothing is brought to the
perceptual process from the outside (such as previous experience in general) but that attention is focused on the picture per se, or on what it represents.
In describing the various internal sources of meaning
we are dealing with the sources that subjects most
frequently use when responding to an interviewer's
request for the description of a picture; the sources
reflect the subject's task orientation. Thus, particularly at the beginning of a description, we find a fairly
rapid attempt to identify objects and the scene or setting which contains them ("This part of the picture
seems to take place in some sort of castle") and
perhaps an equally rapid identification of people in
roles and role activities ("Woman, standing on a shell
on the sea, with ... can't figure it out, I guess it's a
horn"). Some subjects are sensitive to body positions
and the meaning they convey ("I think he is turning
either like this away from her or like this around towards her"). Some subjects attempt an integration of
these various sources and construct a scenario, which
can be construed as a schema for making coherent
that which appears disparate (".Maybe she's about to
leave the circus or something, I don't know. I think
probably that she is drawing apart from her family and
that her husband, who might be the Harlequin, is
keeping them all there"). Whether a scenario has
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been constructed or not, consistency and clarity
(through an implied schema) may be .tri~d f~,r by deduction from clues internal to the pamtmg ( ... she
seems fairly happy, the kid looks okay, so maybe i~'s a
mother"). Somewhat akin to deductive reasomng,
but with the logical flow reversed, is the search for
corroborative evidence ("She might seem to represent vice, or something, ... because she seems like a
filled-out sack"). Less frequent, especially in a group
not selected for its esthetic competence, is attention
to formal properties ("It's done in pastels"), which
may or may not be explicitly tied to meaning ("The
brown and yellow give a sort of depraved .eff~ct").
Rarer still is the attempt to account for ambJgUJty by
attending to compositional needs ("I think it's just for
the effect of the balance in terms of color").
Finally, subjects make it obvious that their own
needs, wishes, and emotional reactions can be a
source of the picture's meaning as well. Pictures are
not merely visually registered and cognitively processed; they are also admired, ridiculed, embraced,
rejected, loved, hated, and treated with ambivalence.
In some individuals such reactions are barely perceptible, while in others they may overwhelm the cognitive processing; in a few, there exists a salutary balance. Particularly at the beginning of a description,
one may meet with an undifferentiated affective burst
("Oh, my!"), which may reflect a quickly established
identification with a figure (as when a subject imitates
the figure's pose or expends inordinate emotional
energy on it). A subject may attribute feeling to the
figure he is looking at(" ... or he might be in agony at
the sentence which has just been passed upon him by
a judge") or to the picture as a whole ("The most
important thing ... is the feeling of mother-child
tranquillity and proudness"), or he might attribute
character to figures ("For some reasons I make this
into a good woman and this into a bad one"). There
may be an overt projection of fantasy (" ... he seems
that sort of adolescent or small-town hood that's got
to prove himself, and everything becomes part of the
proving") or a clear projection of one's own needs,
conflicts, or healthy coping mechanisms (" ... this
seems to have ... a sense of complexity comparable
to my own"). Finally, emotional involvement may be
so strong as to make one inattentive either to the
picture or to the interviewer; inattention can be
judged from the subject's direction of gaze or from
the prevalence of fantasy over perception throughout
the interview.

SCHEMA FORMATION
The third process that occurs, simultaneously with
the other two, is the formation of a schema. A schema
may be quite definitive, allowing the subject to feel
satisfied with his perception or interpretation, or it
may be tentative, eliciting further search for evidence
or leading the subject to form further schemata.
How do we know what schemata a subject has
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formed and where they begin and end? It must be
admitted that identifying schemata requires a process
of judgment which is somewhat ill-defined; . it. is a
judgment that can be reached only after exammmg a
portion of a transcript, and it is therefore a construction after the fact. It is quite possible that different
judges might "see" different schemata at work; our
research has not focused on interjudge reliability and
a decision on the obviousness of schemata must be
examined in a future study. But there is no question
about the need for the concept; the two processes we
have identified so far are too discrete and too
molecular to account for the larger organization that
is, in the very least, subjectively felt to be present.
Our procedure for deciding what schemata were in
use was to identify the smallest number of ideas, percepts, or fantasies that would subsume the contents
of the verbal transcript.

THE QUESTION OF FORMAL THEORY

Admittedly, the three processes we have just described may be viewed as categories of analysis, not
as a theory of how they are integrated, and the description may be disappointing in that it is not presented as a series of propositions ordered linearly
or hierarchically. There are, however, excellent
theoretical reasons why an overall theory of meaning
construction cannot be formulated, just as an overall
theory of another cognitive function, such as memory
(Jenkins 1974), remains unattainable. Principal among
them is that meaning construction, like imagination
or reasoning, is a function, not a mechanism; it is an
abstraction made by us from the actions of subjects
who are acting in an artificial context, and the
abstraction, while valid enough for this particular
context, must not be confused with a mechanism
whose hierarchical ordering, or progression in time,
is fixed. As a function, meaning construction performs a service for the organism, but the organism, so
to speak, has to request the service; because the services requested may differ, the function will vary.
But to say that a formal theory is an impossibility is
not to imply that we can have no general understanding of the processes used. At this point we are
prepared to suggest at least that what various individuals' interpretations of pictures have in common is
(1) coherence, that is, organization around a small
number of schemata; and (2) order, that is, progression from information to hypothesis (or schema) to
evidence, and then around again as often as necessary, in a manner which in science would be called
hypothetico-deductive. The interpretations differ in
the source of the hypotheses (the picture itself, its
antecedents, or the viewer's needs), in the ability to
note formal structure, and in a host of other important ways, but they are all essentially processes of
construction.
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INTERVIEWS

Both the general processes and the diverse details
can be illustrated. During the course of our research
on the meaning of body movements we collected a
number of reproductions of paintings which depicted
a range of physical arrangements of bodies. To gather
information on how these arrangements were perceived we asked subjects to comment on "what they
saw"; we were generally (but not often enough)
careful to avoid disclosing what we were interested
in, so as not to magnify the perceptual importance of
body movements. At times we presented the reproduction with significant portions masked; this procedure permitted us to see how the unmasked
portions-such as a few figures, or even body
parts-were interpreted in isolation from their context. The interviews were tape-recorded and a large
number of them were also transcribed; the excerpts
that follow were chosen from the transcripts. It will be
clear that the questions the interviewer chooses to
ask, the points he wishes to have clarified, and
perhaps his own perception of the pictures may influence what the subject will report he is seeing; and
that the subject may feel called upon to demonstrate
competence, sensitivity, and other qualities. Nevertheless, given the diversity of interpretations of the
same picture, we may be sure that the subject has
contributed significantly.
The interview excerpts are followed by two columns, one of which analyzes the sources of evidence
from which meaning is drawn and the other indicating the perceptual strategies that the transcript
suggests (the schemata are discussed separately).
Because the interviews are quite long, only passages long enough to illustrate specific points are excerpted. The first column is self-explanatory in that
it makes note of each new source of evidence; in the
second column, however, it is presumed that each
strategy persists until it is replaced by another
strategy (as "picture as content" may be replaced by
"picture as picture"). Because attention to parts is so
much more frequent than attention to the whole, this
strategy will be specifically noted only when it signals
the end of whole-perception; at all other times it will
be assumed.
In Excerpt 1, a female subject recognizes the
painter and gives a fairly rapid and concentrated report on the essence of the scene she is looking at (the
reproduction of Mary Cassatt's Mother and Child was
not available). She alternates quite flexibly in her perceptual strategies; in her search for evidence, she
chooses to identify the painter and her school and,
keeping that identification in mind, characterizes the
two figures by their roles and adds a plausible fantasy; she then returns to a few problems raised by her
early identification of the school, then again returns
to the figures and the feeling they evoke. Her perception, as concentrated as it seems, may be said to

be organized around two schemata: the impressionist
style and the peacefulness of the mother-child relation.
Excerpt 2 describes the initial reaction of a male
subject to the same painting. The subject seems unaware of the picture as a picture; he attempts to dispose of the interviewer's question with a brief, definitive answer, and after detouring suspiciously
about the purpose of the interview, identifies the
principals in the standard manner, ventures a hesitant
statement of feeling, and then fastens upon a relatively rare interpretation: the apparent awkwardness
of the child's position on the mother's lap. Because
the subject gives evidence of frugality with his feelings and hesitancy in committing himself to any interpretation beyond irrefutable facts, it may be said
that his perception is organized around two
schemata, that of woman with child and that of emotional discomfort and withholding (both felt within
the interview situation and projected into the painting). Since there is less of a good fit between his
emotional expressiveness and that of the painting,
the contribution of his personal needs to the interpretation is more prominent.
Excerpt 3 differs from the first two in several respects. As the analysis of perceptual strategies shows,
there is little variation in the manner of approaching
the painting, Botticelli's The Birth of Venus (Figure 1),
but there is a relentless production of thoughts and
hypotheses (the entire transcript spans ten singlespaced pages). This combination may be one index of
obsessive thinking, that is, thinking that is voluminous in total production and meticulous in its attention
to detail, but in the long run repetitive. The subject, a
male, first identifies the dramatis personae, and when
the somewhat impatient interviewer interrupts to request an interpretation of the figures on the left, the
subject reduces his uncertainty by the assumption of
mythical meaning; once this assumption has been
made, the rest becomes a matter of filling in details
and finding corroborating evidence. He is quick to
spot a dramatic conflict (as between the various figures, between clothing and nudity, and eventually
between nature and civilization and other abstractions), but, as a reading of the remainder of the transcript shows, the single-minded determination to uncover conflicts looks very much like the projection,
under multiple disguises, of a single conflict of his
own. Thus there seems to be operating essentially
one perceptual-cognitive schema: that of a conflict
between shameful nudity and the higher purposes of
civilization. It is a tribute to his hypothetico-deductive
skill that, in the absence of a title or of a precise determination of the myth which is the subject of the
painting, he makes the corroborating evidence fit as
well as he does.
When looked at from the point of view of perceptual strategies, Excerpt 4 is quite similar to Excerpt 3:
the assumptions do not vary much, while the search
for evidence is complex. But we are not dealing with
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Excerpt 1

5: You want me to tell you what I see? Well, I see an impressionistic work of Mary Cassatt' s, a mother holding
a child ... both seem directed towards something .. .
as perhaps the father or maybe a loving grandmother,
and the mother looks as though she might be showing the baby to somebody quite close to her and it
looks as though there is quite a bit of color in this,
it' s also done in pastels and maybe some charcoal in
it and then . . . with the ... as it is impressionist . ..
done in a quite impressionistic style , it would be helpful to see the color, and it's got a very Renoir-like texture in the skin except for the hair is quite linear of
the baby's and the hands are very crudely molded,
and the hands of the baby are, too. The most important
thing of this is the feeling of mother-child tranquillity
and proudness, and peace and fulfillment that she has
in showing off something which ...

Evidence for meaning

Perceptual strategies

Identification of painter and
period
Role, role activity

Picture as product
Picture as content
Observer viewpoint

Projection of fantasy

Attention to formal
properties

Picture as picture

Attribution of feeling to
picture

Whole

I: What makes you say that she is peaceful and fulfilled?
5 : Because she looks very peaceful and fulfilled in her
eyes.

Attention to body position

Excerpt 2

I: This is our first picture and all we want you to do is just
describe what you see.
5: A woman holding a child up ... The woman looks
like she's showing the child something, perhaps raising
her high enough so that the kid can see. That' s the
situation.

Role , role activity
Projection of fantasy
Assumption of overall
message?

Picture as content
Observer viewpoint

I: Well, you can just keep going as long as you can think
of things to say.
5: Well, is this like ink blot?

(Inquiry about perceptual
set)

I: No, no. It's not a personality test at all , we ' re just curious as to , well, what you see in the picture.
5: Simply a woman holding a child ... can ' t tell whether
it's hers or not .. . no indication ... she seems fairly
happy, the kid looks okay , so maybe it' s a mother.
Holding her kid rather awkwardly, it seems.

Role , role activity
Attribution of feeling to
figure
Deductive reasoning from
internal cues
Attention to body position

I: What ... why do you say that it' s awkward?
5: The hand position of the child is .. . seems to be trying
to shift the mother's hands to another spot , as if you ' d
picked [up] a cat incorrectly or any other animal.

Attention to body position

Participant viewpoint?

Projection of conflict
(refusal to commit self)

Observer viewpoint

I: And you think that the mother and the child are both
fairly content, except for the child ' s being slightly uncomfortable.
5: Yeah, if it's a mother and a child situation.
I : I see. What do you think the mother might be exhibiting the child to?
5: It could be a matter of just showing the child to some
other people or showing the child something ... it
could work either way, I think.

Projection of fantasy (upon
request)

Excerpt 3

I: This is a somewhat different type of pi cture.
5: Woman . . . standing on a shell on the sea . .. with . ..
can 't figure it out, I guess it's a horn .
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Role and role activity
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Picture as content
Observer viewpoint

I: Where?
S: Right here.
I: Oh, yeah, yeah, in that pink ....
S: Pink blanket or shawl or whatever you call it .. . and
another woman is ... oh, I see ... well, the first thing
I see is that this woman is giving the other woman
a blanket to clothe herself with ... oh, and I see,
it's ... that's a collar, I get that, see, and she puts it
around here and she covers herself with ....

Identification of objects
Role activity

I: Yeah, so somebody seems sort of cold there and is
about to be covered by the woman on the right. What
do you make of the actions of the figures on the left?
S: Obviously they're mythological ... seem to be
mythological figures being what Aeolis, I think, he's
the god of the winds, blowing the wind there ... I
suppose that's his wife there ... well, she's (laughs)
making sure that he doesn't get away from her (both
laugh).

Assumption of ritual
meaning
Corroborating evidence
Role activity

Participant viewpoint

Corroborating evidence

Observer viewpoint

I: And she's making sure byS: She's clasped around him ... although it would ...
now, here again, it would seem he has no intention at
all of getting away from her .or elsewise he's blowing so hard, you know, the idea, you know, the fable,
the sun and the wind .. . if you want her to put on
clothes, you make a cloak-cold, you know, but if you
don't want to, you know, blow soft, balmy winds ...
and evidently he is ... well, I don ' t know, maybe he
is blowing a soft, balmy wind . I don't know ... because she certainly doesn't seem too eager to-

Assumption of overall
messages

Projection of conflict
(seesawing ambivalence)

1: Yeah, yeah, what do you make of her various gestures,
her pose, you know, as a whole, the way her body
stands orS: She is off balance ... at least it would, it seems to me
anyway you can look at it, she's off ... she should . ..
maybe her legs have dropped ... or maybe the center
of gravity shifts around ....

Attention to body position
Projection of conflict (ambivalence)

I: But she appears off balance in which direction, to the
right or to the left?
S: To the right. Tending toward the clothes, I suppose ...
that 's right, these people aren 't ... no ... these people ... this person's got some clothes on. Maybe that's
the artist's propriety that he put some clothes around
her, you know, that might be. But here again we have
a contrast; unclothed versus clothed.

obsessiveness; rather, we are dealing with a singleminded involvement produced by a strong emotional
reaction to the figure of Venus-a reaction that
suggests identification, but one based in part on
finding in Venus qualities which are unacceptable to
the subject. The subject is a woman; she begins with
an undifferentiated affective reaction, which is
elaborated upon the interviewer's request, only to be
succeeded by another. A further question brings out
a rather sharp but exact description of Venus, and a
distinction between the subject's perception and the
artist's presumed intention. The coldly-but-unsuccessfully-sexy-Venus schema then carries the subject
through to the end of the excerpt, with appropriate
corroborating evidence and projection of what one
might suspect to be unacceptable characteristics of
the self.

Attribution of intention to artist
Projection of conflict
(transformed from its previous version)

To emphasize that it is the subject's identification
with Venus, rather than an enduring predisposition,
that determines the singleness of purpose in the preceding excerpt, we present a brief portion of a later
part of the interview, one in which the subject was
discussing other figures. Here, in Excerpt 5, it will be
apparent that she uses deductive reasoning flexibly
and exactly and that she can test a hypothesis on her
own empathetic response to the figure's movement.
Control of the interpretive process by schemata is
nowhere better shown than in the sudden restructuring of perception that occurs when a new schema
supplants an old one. Such a schema may be the invention of the observer, it may follow the discovery of
a title, or it may result from accepting a suggestion
from the interviewer. The subject in Excerpt 6 is a
female who had adopted a rather moralistic stance
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Figure 1

-The Birth of Venus by Botticelli.
Excerpt 4
Evidence for meaning

Perceptual strategies

Undifferentiated affect

Picture as content
Whole
Observer viewpoint

I: Just one more.
S: I don 't like it.
I: You do or you do not?
S: No, I don 't.
I: Tell me why.
S: It' s too ornate and artificial and un-lifelike.

Corroborating evidence

I: What are they doing?
S: What kind of a picture is this? It looks almost like a
photograph, of various and sundry statues. What are
they doing? This picture just leaves me cold. I mean,
I have ... I don 't even care to ... particularly to give
an interpretation.

Picture as picture
Undifferentiated affect

I: You mean , you don 't even care about what' s going on?
S: It doesn't interest me.

Avoidance of picture

I: Now, I respect that, but ... can you tell meS: (Laughs) I imagine the woman in the middle is supposed to personify the ideal, feminine , beautiful , sort
of coldly sexy type woman.

Attribution of intention
to artist and character to
figure

Part

Corroborating evidence

Picture as content

I: What makes her coldly sexy?
S: Well, she' s the color .. . she hasn 't any warmth .. .
she hasn 't got any ... her skin doesn 't have any blood
under it particularly. It is a little too rigid, you don ' t
see any ... I mean, if you looked at someone' s body
I don't think it would appear so distinctly marked.
And I suppose that he' s ... the artist has managed
to give the impression of a circle by various curves . ..
curved lines around her stomach which would probably
indicate the ability to have children , say. Seems a little
along that line, which doesn't impress me.

Attribution of intention to
artist

I: Does that mean . .. let me make sure that I understand
what does impress you . The fact that he ' s trying despite
the white coldness of her skin to make her lifelike,
you know, to give her the possibility of bearing life or-
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S: It doesn't look like she's human enough to give birth to
any other human. It looks like she's maybe something
very nice to look at as a statue that someone has carved;
as a woman she doesn't seem to have very much. And
also the fact that her face looks sort of blah, her eyes
are half-shut and she doesn't .. . she has the same ...
she has a hand placed approximately the same way
as the woman in the other picture did.

Attribution of character to figure

(Probably partial projection of unacceptable
characteristics as corroborating evidence)

I: What do you think it means?
S: But the woman in the other picture ... the woman
in the other picture at least seemed to be expre~sing
some kind of emotion and this woman here just looks
melodramatic ... here. But her face doesn't go with it.

Attribution of character to figure

I: So you think that the gesture and the face aren't5: It could be modesty.

Alternate attribution of feeling

I: Yes. Why do you say it could be melodramatic too?
S: Oh, because I've seen . .. I think I've seen very very
poor movies or television shows or something where
someone has attempted to carry out this gesture effectively and they had about the same expression on
their face and they didn ' t ... because she doesn't
seem to be feeling anything ... to look on her face ...
but this sort of ... doesn't gibe. And the fact that she's
holding her hair down over whatever part of her . ..
genitals seems ... I guess, with the hand, the way
they're balancing it would appear she's holding it there
for modesty's sake, sort of demonstrate an inborn
humility, say. The woman over here on the right with
the garment ... I don't know whether she's just putting it over her or just taking it off.

Corroborating evidence

Attention to body position

Deductive reasoning from internal cues
(body position

~

intention)

Role activity

Excerpt 5

I: But if I'm understanding correctly, you would have said
that she's putting the cloak on even if you hadn't
seen ...
S: Because her hair is blowing ...

Corroborating evidence

I: I see, right. But not because of anything in the position of the woman on the right?
S: Well, I thought about that but I .. . the fact that she's
standing up on her toes .. . and she could be either
reaching for or just coming back from. Wait a minute .. . or could she ... no, actually, I think you'd
have to interpret this gesture as just putting on, because if she were just coming back from having it taken
off her left foot would be down farther. As it is, she
is propelling herself up with it. No, the more I look
at it, the more I'm sure she's putting it on. And
apparently the woman who is holding the cloak is in
a position of some sort of-well, she is subservient to
this other woman.

Picture as content
Part
Observer viewpoint

Deductive reasoning
from internal cues

Empathy with movement?

Role activity
Role

I: Why do you say that?
S: Her face is less pronounced, her hair is less long and
flowing, seems a little more trained, a little less what
I would imagine they considered beautiful. And she's
dressed in something that has a lot of material to it
that isn't just a flowing robe.

toward the dancer in Toulouse-Lautrec's portrait
Marcelle Lender (Figure 2). She had described the
dancer as grotesque, awkward, and exhibitionistic,
and was shocked that a woman of her age and corpulence should be dressed in this manner and be at-

Corroborating evidence

tempting a ballet step. Midway through the interview
the following interchange took place:
It is possible that a single affective schema is most
likely to arise in cases where a strong identification
with a single figure takes place. Group scenes in which
CONSTRUCTION OF PICTORIAL MEANING
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Figure 2

-Marcelle Lender by Toulouse-Lautrec.

no figure predominates may require a
attention which, while not discouraging
volvement, attenuates it sufficiently to
domination of the interpretive process

diffusion of
affective inprevent the
by a single

schema. But that is not to say that group scenes make
it difficult to entertain prominent fantasies; the fantasies may be just as potent but their consequences
for perception somewhat different. In Excerpt 7, a
sexual interpretation of Manet's Le dejeuner sur
/'herbe (Figure 3) seems to have been made very
shortly upon seeing the picture, but in this excerpt it
is only hinted at (and is revealed as the organizing
schema only subsequently). Its consequence, surprisingly enough, is inattention to the picture and to
the interviewer; the interviewer's questions can serve
to focus the subject's attention, but, as further portions of this transcript show, they do so only
momentarily. The subject is a woman, somewhat
older than the college population. It should be noted
that the subject at one point appears to adopt the
participant viewpoint: she seems to identify with the
woman/victim and perceives the painting from her
point of view, that is, as depicting the actions of
aggressor/males.
While the preceding excerpt strongly suggested an
interplay between the observer and participant
viewpoints, Excerpt 8 makes it explicit. The subject is
describing Tintoretto'sAdam and Eve (Figure 4) , and has
clearly corroborated his perception ofthe man (whom he
has not definitely identified as Adam) as rejecting the
woman's advancing body and proffered apple. The
interviewer asks for further evidence from the man ' s
body orientation and obtains an unexpected answer.
In effect, the subject performs a rather unusual feat:

Excerpt 6
Evidence for meaning

Perceptual strategies

I: Suppose I tell you that this is a representation of a . ..
you know, this is on a scene , on a theatrical scene .
S: Thatthisisawhat?
I: This is on a stage.
S: Oh.
I: What difference does that make?
S: In everything you mean?
I: Well , all right , in anything .
S: Well , she could obviously be playing a part then . And
then it would be natural.

Role activity

Pi cture as content
Observer viewpoint

I: The blue one?
S: The blue one, well , all of them could be playing parts .
Funny, that did not o ccur to me. In which case it would
be perfectly natural for a lady of higher class to be
here, for a woman to be dressed in slack s, as a footman perhaps or as a disguise . .. . That could be a
very studied look on her face, a very . .. (I : the blue
one) a very cultivated, yes , the one in blue. Very cultivated . She reminds me of . .. (the one in pink now)
of Anna Russell and of . . . oh , what' s the one who
played in Auntie Marne?

Scenario (followed by
affective relief)
Deduction from
external cues

Search for supplementary
information

I: I don 't remember.
S: No . . . Rosalind (1: Russell ) Rosalind Russell. That' s
w~at I mea~t, not Anna Russell. You know when you
thmk about 1t on the stage this is funny . There is almost
a delicacy in her face. Even though it' s grotesque for
the action she is doing.
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Whole
Part

Figure 3

-Le dejeuner sur l'herbe by Manet.
Excerpt 7

Evidence for meaning

Perceptual strategies

(Mis)identification of period

Picture as picture
Whole
Observer viewpoint

I: One more pair.
5: I've seen this recently.
I: You've probably seen this a number of times.

5: Huh?
I: You ' ve probably seen this a number of times.

5: It' s English.
I: Anywa-y, what are the figures-

5: It's the ... I know, it's in that ... Barbizon collection ... I believe it's part of the Barbizon collection.
I: I didn't see the Barbizon collection.

5: There's one ... there's one-if it isn't the same onethat's almost similar. The Barbizon collection ...
no ...

Continued misidentification
Inattention to interviewer
and picture
Probable avoidance
of picture (and of
interviewer) while
preoccupied with own
fantasies

I: What do you make of the people in the picture?
5: What?
I: What do you make of the people in the picture?
5: I think it's a couple of school-boys out on a lark
whether they're school-boys or whether they're older
men ... I'm just ... a lark. They being fully clothed
and the woman with her raiment on the ground and
the other one obviously cleaning up. just strikes you
as being a little bit ... well, the ... woodland idyll,
or something of that nature.

Role, role activity;
projection of fantasy

Participant viewpoint
Part

I: Well, why would they be clothed and she unclothed?
5: ... Object of pleasure-make her wander around
naked and maybe pick up a case of poison ivy ...
and their own Victorian prudishness ... allows them
to look but not to touch ... and not participate (I:
right.) I'm speaking of the Victorian prudishness .. .
of the painter not the persons within the frame ... .

Projection of conflict
(denial of previous
fantasy)
Attribution of intention
to artist
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125

Figure 4

-Adam and Eve by Tintoretto.

the sheer number of his observations), because of the
wealth of his fantasy material (his ability to spin out
scenario and character in appropriate relation to the
image), and because of the flexibility of his perceptual
assumptions (his shifting back and forth on all three
of the perceptual dimensions). He shows that it is
possible to have a lively fantasy life and affective involvement and yet at the same time maintain perceptual sharpness and richness. However, as a
reading of his transcript indicates, one schema or-

while the common viewpoint adopted here is the
participant viewpoint--one in which Adam's gesture
is understood in relation to Eve's and which the subject had also adopted up to this point -in response to
the interviewer's question the subject places Adam
directly into relation with himself.
The next two excerpts present as unusual subject,
this time a male. He is important because of the richness of his perception (both the vividness of his impressions when presented with a reduced image and
Excerpt 8

S: Right. And her eyes and everything, her whole face
looks quite relaxed.

Evidence for meaning
Attention to body position,
attribution of feeling

Perceptual strategies
Picture as content
Observer viewpoint

1: But nevertheless you perceive her intention very
clearly: it is to lean toward him and give him the apple.
S: Right, to give him ... and his is to reject it.

Attention to body position

I: I was wondering how else the body or parts of the
body helped you to arrive at this interpretation-of
the relaxed versus tense, giving-refusing, pulling away.
For example, the orientation of the body: is there anything about that?
S: You mean aside from the hand gestures and the ...
(I: the hand gestures) . .. angle; yeah, well now, certainly the most obvious thing is that you see her in a
frontal view and you see her whole front body, and
you see his back; you know, you think of the back of
somebody as rejecting; when somebody turns his back
at you, it's a rejecting thing rather than ....

Attention to body position

I: That's interesting: even though his back isn't turned
toward her ...
S: ... it's turned towards the observer, yeah, right.
1: It's communicated to the observer, that he is rejecting.
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Observer viewpoint
replacing the more
normal participant
viewpoint

ganizes the perceptions and feelings in this excerpt:
that of the clarity, straightforwardness, and airiness of
the Venus and Adonis by Rubens (Figure 5; it is referred to by the letter R) in contrast to the stuffy,
enclosed, morally unclear atmosphere informing the
same theme as treated by Titian (Figure 6; referred to
as T). These two pictures are at first presented with
the upper half masked.
The final excerpt, in which the subject can see both
pictures in their entirety, shows two qualities of note.
While the preceding segment indicated that considerable material can be incorporated under one organizing schema, the following one, Excerpt 10,
reassures us that our subject's schemata are flexible.
After elaborating on the original distinction between
the "good" Rubens and the "bad" Titian, he brings
himself up short, takes note of what he has been saying, and looks at the paintings afresh; his new perception makes him wonder whether the order and
clarity of the Rubens are not excessively self-contained and whether what had initially appealed to
him might not later bore him. Both sets of reactions
seem consistent with his coping mechanism; we
know him to be both a complex and a clear thinker,
and it follows that an object which is appealing for its
clarity may not also be appealing for its complexity. It
seems proper to suggest that, after the change, his
perception of these paintings is informed by one
schema: the projection of a coping mechanism.

CONCLUSIONS

We have attempted to analyze several examples of
verbal response to paintings and thereby to describe

Figure 5

a type of perceptual process-a process which is
complex enough to permit distinct perceptual
strategies and to require varied sources of evidence.
The examples make clear, we believe, that the process is constructive and inferential: it consists of the
formation of schemata from partial evidence and of
their confirmation from evidence subsequently
gathered. Both the schemata and the evidence can
have various sources (internal to the painting or the
observer, or external to both). While the schemata
appear to be formed from evidence encountered
early in the searching process, they are not necessarily maintained by evidence alone; they can serve to
direct a search for corroborative evidence only, or
they can act as filters through which further evidence
is interpreted.
It seems to us that the process we have tentatively
analyzed leads to three areas where further elaboration is desirable. The first concerns the relation between schemata, perceptual strategies, and sources
of evidence. Once adequate interjudge reliabilities
have been established, a more formal attempt should
be made to establish the end points of schemata in
time so that they could be related to the more discrete
processes occurring simultaneously. A beginning
might be made by relating, through appropriate statistical procedures, changes in schemata to changes in
sources of meaning and perceptual strategies. Such a
procedure could result in an understanding of the
relationships existing among our categories of verbal
productions; but it would seem even more important
to relate the verbal categories to nonverbal indiCfi~s-for example, to study the points at which eye
movement fixations coincide with changes in schemata (or perceptual strategies, or, more likely, sources
of meaning). At what points, one would ask, does

-Venus and Adonis by Rubens.
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Figure 6

-Venus and Adonis by Titian.

Excerpt 9

Evidence for meaning

Perceptual strategies

I: This is going to be a comparison ... two at on ce . . .
I think it may be the easiest thing . Both will be partly masked and ... (5: laughs) ... and when you talk
about them, why don 't you refer to them as T and R.
S: Okay. I keep thinking it' s by the same person .. . I
don 't know at all, the ... legs seem the same.

Picture as picture
Observer viewpoint

I: The legs are not the same, you say?
S: No, they do seem the same.
I: Aha, I see.
S: The men's legs do, although her legs seem .. . seem
quite different from her legs.
I: Yeah. What do you make of the leg positions? In other
words, what is in each picture? How are the people
related?
S: Yeah . Well, it looks as if in T they were having some
sort of sexual contact . .. I mean, contact which was
primarily sexual, while here, they' re having contact- in
R-the man is getting ready to leave or something or
has just come back .. . but, but, but it' s ... here it' s a
contact of a ritual leaving or departure in R, while in
T it's much more ... it seems much more concentratedly sexual without any other particular reason for
being, which is then accentuated by the fact that you
got a ... well, I guess, it's Cupid, but it looks like a
child here, while here you got a lecherous dog, panting
in the corner ...

Attention to body position
Projection of fantasy
Role activity

Picture as content
Participant viewpoint

Attribution of ritual meaning

Whole

Search for corroborating
evidence

Part
Observer viewpoint

I: Yes. Do you think that dog panting in the corner helped
form your interpretation of something overtly sexual
going on in T?
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Evidence for meaning

Perceptual strategies

S: No, I think in T I had the feeling first and then I used
the dog to support it.

1: In T what gave you that feeling?
S: The fact that she's leaning over towards him and I think
I've seen these both before, too, but I don't have a
firm grasp of them anyway; but I mean, she seems-in
T she seems sort of a hot, flagrant ... I don't know.

Attention to body position

Part
Participant viewpoint

Feeling tied to
corroborating evidence

1: Tell me why, this is interesting.
S: Part of the reason is because her flesh is much less
clearly defined. In other words, here, in R, where the
folds and the sharp points of the woman ... I'm more
interested in her ... as a person, while here (in T)
she is ... she might seem to represent vice or something (laughs slightly). I just ... because she seems
like a soft filled-out sack, rather than a human being.

Feeling tied to
corroborating evidence

Observer viewpoint

Assumption of overall
message
Corroborating evidence

1: Where is the male figure standing in T, or whatever
you say?
S: Well, you can't ... you can ' t tell where exactly. I think
he is turning either like this away from her O! like this
around towards her. I can't tell which. Both of these
could be simply departure scenes like ... here it seems
like he's ready to go on a hunt-in R-and Cupid is
holding him back, while in Tit could be the same thing,
but ... for some reason I make this into a good woman
and this into a bad one, I don't know why. I make R
into the good woman and T into the bad woman, I
don't know why.

Attention to body position
Role activity
Assumption of overall
message

Participant viewpoint

Attribution of character

Observer viewpoint

1: That' s interesting. Maybe you could speculate on why.
S: Well, I tried to tell you about the flesh and maybe her
having a bare ass makes her more obscene or something. Although if it was a different ass, I don't think
I would think it was obscene. And then the . . . Cupid ' s
looking like a child and these being sort of noble dogs
makes this into ... I mean, these people in R are sort
of in the world ... they seem to have good reasons
for what they're doing, while in T it sort of seems like
a ... brown and yellow ... sort of twilight ... depraved effect.

Corroborating evidence

Corroborating evidence
Projection of fantasy
Attention to formal
properties; attribution of
feeling to picture

Whole

1: Yeah. I see. So the colors are somewhat cooler and
perhaps more varied in R, you're saying ... somewhat
seem anchored in the world of-you know-noon ...
the sort of thing that's real: day.
S: Not ... well, more classical; noon, yeah. I mean it's
more defined there, and in other words ... in other
words, for some reason .... Let's arbitrarily make both
these women into temptresses who have no reason to
stop men hunting or doing whatever they're going to
do ... no reason ... and they're just doing it out of
perversity or something. Out of ... boredom. I feel
they might as well get laid rather than have the guy
go off and hunt. Here (R) if the guy stopped and made
love to her ... fine, while here (T) I'd feel that he might
not get out of it again ever (laughs). He seems ...
like he has a sort of very small horizon . .. a sort of
small-town kid who has ambitions to leave the small
town, but stays back out of sort of childlike, dependent
reasons ... except this ...

Corroborating evidence
Part
Projection of
fantasy

Fantasy related to formal
properties

Excerpt 10

S: His bearing too, it seems; (in T) he's poised to flee
while (in R) he is securely where he is.

Attention to body
position

Picture as content
Observer viewpoint

1: In R, he is securely where he is.
S: Yes, he's got a different sort ... his (R) balance seems
directed towards wanting to do one of the two things,
while his (T) seems immobile and frozen, you see.

Attention to body
position
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1: And what makes it frozen in the case ofT?
5: He's moving away but he's ... the shaft looks like i~'s
stuck in the earth, and the dog is going to keep hrm
there, yet his whole body is mainly away from the
woman ... and ...

Corroborating evidence

Participant viewpoint

1: So, 1 see, there's a lot of things pulling him in either
direction in the case of T, whereas in the case of R
it's fairly ... firmly rooted, and whatever indecision ...
5: No, no, no, no, no. I really don 't think he is-in T-1
1 don 't think he is in contact with the outside world.
In other words, he' s going through all these ... well,
he seems, like I said, well, that sort of adolescent or
small town hood that's got to prove himself and everything becomes part of the proving. And you know,
nothing exists for itself. In other words, it's precisely
Adonis' strength-in R-that he is able to be in contact
with the outside world ... and he'll be in contact with
it, in a more clean, open way, it seems.

Projection of
fantasy

I: 3o Adonis is ... he determines his own fate?
5: In R. To the extent that a man is able to. I mean, I don 't
think he ' s flawless. But I think he ' ll do well, whatever ... I mean I' ll sympathize with whatever he does,
while I won't with whatever he does, in T. It' s funny
too, the dogs are both looking back here, in R, but it
seems sort of a friendly, noble interest. In other words,
maybe the dogs want to go hunting and they don't
realize that he's being held back but they don't feel
resentment, while the only reason-in T-1 have the
feeling the dog doesn't care where he is as long as
he's got something that he can root into with his
snout ... I never realized I had such simple ideas of
good and evil, but this is certainly bringing them out.

Projection of
fantasy
Corroborating evidence
Projection of
fantasy

Awareness of projection
of conflict

I: That's interesting. That happened to me, too, when
contrasting these two paintings ... a lot of ambivalence
about both of them. Anything else you want to say
about them?
S: I was wondering if the one by Rubens would get boring
after a while.

Awareness of projection
of coping mechanism
(justified ambivalence)

I: What might get boring about it?
5: There isn't anything outside it, like there is a rainbow
here ... I characterize this (R) as classical and it seems
to have the defects of the classical that it's too selfcontained ... I'm just elaborating what I said before . .. it might be like watching a beautifully coordinated baseball player ... I' d love to watch this guy hunt
or the other guy hit, but all he' d be doing would be
playing baseball or hunting ... I' d like to see what
would happen to Rubens ' Adonis if he did run into a
situation that Titian ' s Adonis is in, in other words,
if he stepped out of his clean, classical role into a
muddier one, that' s where the ... my real interest
in his character would lie. Not necessarily in whether
he was in a muddier situation but one that was less
clearly defined to him also, one that called for a different sort of responses than he' s probably used to
making. You know, one that was enough to really
draw him out either in the direction of muddiness from
the direction of reaching for something like the
rainbow.

the observer turn his attention away from the painting and then back again? How much information does
he appear to take in visually before beginning a verbal commentary? At what point in the verbal commentary is he likely to break off for further visual
input? From which parts of the picture does he seek
visual input? To the best of our knowledge, no infor130

Corroborating evidence
Identification of 'period '

Picture as picture
Whole
Observer viewpoint

Projection of coping
mechanisms

Projection of
fantasy

Projection of coping
mechanisms

mation is available on the relation between verbal and
nonverbal indices of what is attended to.
The second area in which elaboration is called for
concerns individual differences. We have viewed
each of our transcripts as typical of the subject's individual style and psychodynamics, and in a rough
sense we were justified in doing so, but we would
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wish to know more about the dimensions on which
the perceptual-constructive process can vary. Theoretically, it could vary on any of our units of analysis, but in practice the variation might be more
limited. Whatever the case, it would be important to
have answers to questions such as these: Do some
individuals use inductive reasoning more than deductive reasoning? Are some subjects more tentative
and flexible in their hypotheses than others? Do all
subjects rely to some extent on fantasy, as we have
assumed, or are some quite devoid of it? How closely
do different subjects reflect their ego defenses and
coping mechanisms in their interpretive process?
How self-conscious and critical are individuals of their
interpretations, and to what extent does self-consciousness affect the process?
But one's focus need not remain on the uniqueness
of each individual viewer; one could easily become
lost in a near infinity of differences. One is under an
obligation to attempt a more general statement of the
process under study, and this constitutes the third
area where elaboration is necessary. We have
suggested earlier that a description that would be
valid for all types of viewers would be too general to
command interest as a formal theory, and we see
nothing in the transcripts to alter that view. But it is
possible to look for regularities at an intermediate
level, that is, to attempt to isolate types. One might
begin, for example, with cognitive styles defined by
others and attempt to relate our perceptual variables
to them; the theoretical work of Shapiro (1965) comes
to mind (that is, his description of the obsessive,
hysterical, impulsive, and paranoid styles), as does
the more empirical work of Gardner et al. (1959). The
task would then be to see whether the variables we
have discussed here would be used differently by
subjects with well-defined cognitive styles. Alternately, one might attempt a fresh classification of
style: a procedure such as factor or cluster analysis
would indicate which perceptual strategies and
sources of evidence co-vary or cluster together. The
advantage of attempting a fresh typology is that we
might discover perceptual styles and that they might
be at least partly distinct from styles of thinking and
fantasizing. All these procedures imply, of course, a
larger and more random sample as well as control of
interrater reliability; the effort would presumably be
repaid by a better description of the elusive flow that
the construction of pictorial meaning represents.

NOTES
1
We wish to thank Dane Archer and Kristina Hooper for reading
the manuscript critically and suggesting numerous improvements.
2
This model refers to and is in part based on the model presented in our earlier work (1974). Two major differences are to be
noted: the categories of analysis presented here refer specifically
to the perception of pictures, thus necessitating the recognition of
certain perceptual strategies that are unnecessary in the perception
of real events, and the hierarchy of categories presented in the
earlier version is here made quite fluid by our greater attention to
the functional nature of perception.
3
There is some similarity between what we call a "source of
meaning" and what Neisser calls an "analyzer." An analyzer is a
distinctive feature which serves to identify an object or at least to
focus the search for identification more narrowly-as, presumably,
the pointy nature and the crossbar of a capital A identify it as that
letter. Our sources of meaning function in much the same way, and
from the purely functional point of view it might seem appropriate
to call them analyzers. However, they seem to involve more complex cognitive operations than is the case with distinctive features
(that is, our sources of meaning may presuppose an earlier successful identification), and they rely more heavily on fantasy (that
is, on previously organized and synthesized material). Whether
these differences are significant or not may be left for future judgment; for the present we wish to point out the similarity of function
once the source of meaning has been chosen by the subject as
evidence for further constructions.
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